Why are white lists used instead of SIM cards to restrict drone internet traffic? Why is traffic from foreign SIM cards possible, and how do these cards get into another country’s territory? If the SIM cards aren’t foreign, how do they end up in other countries? Isn’t it possible for the state with telecom operators to control their activities? First spammers, then scammers deceive elderly people, and operators can’t handle this. Now they can’t restrict traffic from “unauthorized” SIM cards? Meanwhile, they want to charge workers a lot for roaming, but can’t filter foreign traffic. If it’s video, it can be identified by data size. What’s going on, why is everything so complicated?
Russia uses whitelists instead of direct SIM card blocking to manage drones, because this allows for more efficient traffic filtering while maintaining access for legitimate users while simultaneously limiting the ability of drones to use mobile networks for navigation and control. Whitelists work through user verification (for example, through CAPTCHA), which makes it difficult for drones to connect automatically, but does not completely block legitimate subscribers.
Contents
- How Whitelists Work Against Drones
- How SIM Cards Cross Borders
- Challenges in Controlling SIM Cards by Telecom Operators
- Technological Limitations of Traffic Filtering
- Comparison of Approaches: Whitelists vs SIM Blocking
- Economic Aspects and Roaming
- Future Regulation of Drone Threats
How Whitelists Work Against Drones
Whitelists are a more sophisticated tool against drones than simple SIM card blocking, as they allow differentiation between human users and automated devices. According to expert analysis, access to whitelists requires passing a CAPTCHA test, which theoretically should make it difficult for drones to connect to the network, as they cannot pass such verification.
However, reality is more complex. It is known that Russian forces use SIM cards from Ukrainian operator Kyivstar to control Shahed drones. This creates a paradoxical situation where drones can use Ukrainian SIM cards for navigation and control despite existing restrictions.
Whitelists work on the principle of:
- Providing access only to verified users
- Requiring interactive verification
- Limiting automatic connections
- Maintaining legal traffic for citizens
How SIM Cards Cross Borders
SIM cards can cross borders through several channels:
1. Legal channels
- Roaming: According to data, Russia has introduced a 24-hour blocking period for foreign SIM cards when entering the country
- Tourism and business trips: Foreign citizens bring their SIM cards with them
- International shipments: SIM cards can be transported with other goods
2. Illegal channels
- Smuggling: SIM cards are delivered across borders illegally
- Postal shipments: Small batches are sent by mail
- Shadow market: SIM cards are sold through informal distribution channels
As experts note, more and more downed Russian drones are found with Ukrainian SIM cards, which are used to bypass GPS jammers by relying on cellular triangulation for more accurate navigation.
Challenges in Controlling SIM Cards by Telecom Operators
Telecom operators indeed face serious difficulties in controlling SIM cards for several reasons:
Technical limitations
- Scale: Millions of SIM cards in the network make individual monitoring impossible
- Anonymity: Many SIM cards are registered with fake documents
- Cross-border: SIM cards can be registered in one country and used in another
Regulatory barriers
- Sovereignty: Operators cannot simply block traffic without a court decision
- User rights: Blocking SIM cards violates the rights of legitimate subscribers
- International law: Restrictions on the activities of foreign operators
As noted in research, Russia plans to introduce a 24-hour “cooling-off period” for domestic SIM cards if subscribers have been in international roaming or have not used the SIM card for more than 72 hours. This shows that even for domestic SIM cards, control is difficult.
Technological Limitations of Traffic Filtering
Traffic filtering faces complex technological challenges:
Identification problem
- Video traffic: The user rightly asks why video cannot be identified by data size. The answer is that modern networks use traffic compression, and the same amount of data can transmit different content
- Encryption: Drones can use encrypted communication channels
- Camouflage: Drone traffic is disguised as regular internet traffic
Network architecture
- Multi-channel: Drones can use multiple SIM cards and networks simultaneously
- Backup channels: When one channel is blocked, drones switch to another
- Mesh networks: As experts note, Russian drones use mobile communication or mesh networks at launch
Comparison of Approaches: Whitelists vs SIM Blocking
| Parameter | Whitelists | SIM Card Blocking |
|---|---|---|
| Accuracy | High (only verified users) | Low (blocks all SIM users) |
| Effectiveness | Medium (drones can bypass) | High (but affects legitimate users) |
| Technical complexity | High (requires verification infrastructure) | Low (simple blocking by IMEI/ICCID) |
| Legal risks | Low (based on voluntary verification) | High (violation of user rights) |
| Scalability | Medium (depends on infrastructure) | High (easily scalable) |
As analysts emphasize, the 24-hour internet blocking for foreign SIM cards introduced in Russia in October 2025 is a deliberate policy, officially explained as protection against drones, but having other motives: data collection, communication control.
Economic Aspects and Roaming
The situation with roaming and tariffs does indeed look contradictory:
Roaming tariffs
- As reported, operators in neighboring Belarus and Kazakhstan warn travelers that roaming services, including mobile internet, may be restricted
- At the same time, international roaming tariffs remain high for ordinary workers and tourists
Economic consequences
- Operator losses: Traffic blocking reduces roaming revenue
- Reputational risks: Service restrictions negatively impact operator image
- Security investments: Additional investments in filtering systems are required
Future Regulation of Drone Threats
The situation with drone threats continues to evolve:
Measures being developed
- As experts note, a bill is being considered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that would allow mobile internet to be disabled during air raid alerts
- According to data, even a Russian SIM card is no guarantee of internet access - since summer 2025, authorities in various regions have periodically disabled mobile internet to combat Ukrainian drone attacks
Technological solutions
- AI traffic analysis: Using artificial intelligence to detect anomalies
- Geolocation: More precise determination of device locations
- Biometric verification: Additional levels of user verification
The complexity of the situation is explained by the fact that drone threats are evolving faster than protection systems, and the balance between security and freedom of internet access remains a constant challenge for regulators and telecom operators.
Sources
- Russia blocks mobile internet for foreign SIM cards, citing drone threats | The Record from Recorded Future News
- Russia to Impose 24-Hour Mobile Internet Ban to Prevent Drone Attacks — UNITED24 Media
- No SIM city Russia’s plan to stop drones has left tourists cut off from mobile Internet — Meduza
- Russia Restricts Mobile Internet for Returning Citizens to Counter Drone Threat
- Roaming at gunpoint. What are the new restrictions for? It seems we will have a new method of dealing with Ukrainian drones - Pravda Ukraine
- Russia Has Started Blocking Foreign SIM Cards for 24 Hours, Belarus Says - The Moscow Times
- “Surgical censorship”: why Russia blocks roaming for foreign SIM cards | dev.ua
- Russia Plans 24-Hour Internet Blackout for Dormant or Returning SIM Cards - The Moscow Times
- Russia’s 24-Hour Internet Block on Foreign SIM Cards: Traveler Guide & eSIM Tips
- A downed Russian Shahed drone was found with a Ukrainian SIM card, suggesting the technology was used to pilot the explosive drone: think tank
Conclusion
The complexity of the situation with drone traffic control is explained by several factors: the technological complexity of modern communications, limitations of existing security systems, the balance between security and freedom of access, as well as the economic interests of operators. Whitelists are a compromise solution, but not a panacea. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that drones constantly adapt, finding new ways to bypass restrictions. Future regulation will likely involve more complex artificial intelligence systems for traffic analysis and biometric user verification, but complete protection may be impossible given the rapid development of technology.